Levels 33.lev.0003 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

On June 17, 2004 another letter was found in a mechanical engineering book in the drop box of the Wichita Public Library. The letter was immediately handed over to police, who later revealed that it was yet another genuine BTK communication. This time the letter detailed some of the events surrounding the 1974 Otero murders, among other things.

The entire letter's contents have not yet been revealed by authorities. However, it is believed that there might have been more clues present in the letter, which linked the killer to Wichita State University. Initially, it was unclear why the hunt for BTK continuously led the police to the school campus. Yet, in August 2004 investigators finally revealed the significance of the university in their investigation.

Professor P.J. Wyatt, who taught an English literature class at the university between 1964 and 1986, was of interest to police because of a folksong she analyzed titled "Oh Death." The song was of great significance to the BTK killer and inspired a poem he wrote called "Oh! Death to Nancy" which was found in a 1978 letter. It was alleged that the altered poem referenced BTK's murder of Nancy Fox in December 1977. Investigators looked for hidden meanings in the poem that might help them apprehend the killer but it turned out to be of little use. Unfortunately, the professor could not assist investigators in the case because she passed away in 1991 of cancer.



More interesting than "Oh! Death to Nancy" is the poem that BTK wrote to Anna, an intended victim, who did not come home in time to be murdered by BTK. He waited in her home for her to return, but then became impatient and left. This poem, part of which is printed below, commemorates this event.

Oh, Anna Why Didn't You Appear

T' was perfect plan of deviant pleasure so bold on that Spring nite
My inner felling hot with propension of the new awakening season

Warn, wet with inner fear and rapture, my pleasure of entanglement.

The poem is in many ways remarkable because of the levels of meaning that BTK suggests in the words he uses. Reminiscent of James Joyce's epic, Finnegan's Wake, BTK uses words that suggest several meanings. Starting with the very first line in the poem, the T with the superscript 1 is used in scientific research to designate the beginning phase of a study. Subsequent phases would be T2, T3, etc. On another more ordinary level, the superscript 1 could be interpreted as an apostrophe to create "T'was" except that "T'was perfect plan" is missing a word, like "a" or "the." It appears as though whatever BTK had in store for Anna was something "bold" and new.

"Felling," for example, suggests the purposeful killing of a living tree, as well as the taking of Anna's life. It also describes his feelings of excitement as he anticipates his meeting with her. Like Joyce, he creates words by juxtaposing parts of other words. "Propension" is not some mistake on BTK's part, it is his creation of a new word to represent the anticipation of this new encounter. "Propension" may be a combination of other words like "propensity" or "property" or "possessions."



What's the point of these intellectual gymnastics? No doubt, BTK sees himself as an artist and gets pleasure in creating these poems and lyrics with multiple levels of meaning. There is almost certainly another motivation as well. BTK likes to demonstrate his considerable intelligence. He believes that he is a superior intellect and enjoys pointing out to authorities that he is still at large. In other words, he is smarter than all of them local experts, FBI profilers, amateur sleuths, psychics. Thus far, it appears that he is right.

The search for BTK has not only caught the attention of those in the United States but also that of millions around the world. The BTK case has even led to the production of a British documentary film concerning the murders and the ongoing investigation, Theresa Freed reported in a September 2004 KAKE-TV article. Freed reported that the "British film crew not only wants to tell the BTK story but (also) offer police new insight into the case."

The new insight came in the form of a British psychic named Dennis McKenzie who traveled with the crew to Wichita. Freed said that McKenzie has successfully assisted in several high profile investigations, including the Soham murders. He was also able to contribute to the BTK investigation by producing an image of the killer with the help of a sketch artist, as well as other potentially valuable information concerning the murder cases, Freed stated. It is hoped that the new leads will result in the eventual apprehension of the BTK killer. Until that time, Wichita residents are left in a perpetual state of fear, wondering if there will be a new victim in the near future.

judge 9.jud.10043 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

It seemed like all of Gail's friends and relatives knew without a doubt that Bob had killed her. Eventually, the police became persuaded as well. However, there was absolutely no evidence to tie him to Gail's disappearance. And there was Mae Eisenhower who heard the door slam after the argument. Maybe Gail walked out to link up with one of her boyfriends or someone who supplied her with the pills she took.

Gail Katz Bierenbaum missing person's poster
Gail Katz-Bierenbaum missing person's poster

The police were happy to keep this drama as a missing person's case. Without a body, they were loathe to accuse a doctor from a good family with second-degree murder.

And so the case remained on a shelf for many years to come.

Bierenbaum with wife Jane
Bierenbaum with wife Janet

Bob had relocated to Las Vegas and became a very successful plastic surgeon. He was known for his acts of charity and his patients thought highly of him. After a number of brief relationships, he finally met another doctor, Janet Chollet, and they were married. In November of 1998, Janet bore him a daughter.

It looked as though things were finally going well in Dr. Bierenbaum's life. That is, until Andy Rosenzweig, an investigator in the Manhattan D.A.'s office was getting ready to retire. He wanted to close some old cases before he left the job.

New resources were put onto the case and people, especially Bob's old girlfriends and Gail's friends, were interviewed extensively. There were a few titillating discoveries but it was not clear that they were not the result of either bitter broken off relationships between Bob and former girlfriends and exaggerations by Gail in conversations with her friends and psychiatrists.

Still, there was no body and no real evidence to tie Bob to a crime. However, it did not stop a grand jury from indicting him and a jury from convicting him of second-degree murder. The woman judge, who was very hard on crimes against women, gave Bob 20 years to life.

It's not a pretty case: both Gail and Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire had serious personality flaws and never should have married. Bob's bad temper was reasonably well documented, but so was Gail's propensity to use drugs and alcohol to excess. She added a number of extramarital flings to her risky lifestyle. When she apparently stormed out of the apartment that morning in 1985, did she go looking for drugs or companionship with someone that was ultimately responsible for her disappearance? Also, it was well documented that Gail suffered from depression and suicidal tendencies which could have also led to her final disappearance.

It is not beyond reasonable doubt that someone other than Bob was responsible for Gail's disappearance. Furthermore, despite Bob's guilt or innocence, it is disturbing to see a man convicted on such circumstantial evidence. He was, after all, a man of accomplishment who was leading a perfectly respectable life as a member of his community, a charitable surgeon, a good husband and father.

apartment 3.apa.0002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

As reported by Robert Terry and Thomas Gibbons in the Inquirer, Margaret Vaughan, 66, was found lying in the foyer of an apartment building in the 4900 block of Penn Street. She had once lived in an apartment there but had been evicted that same day for nonpayment of rent. Stabbed 29 times, Newton writes, she had been killed just three blocks from where Jeanne Durkin was found earlier in the year.

Police sketch of suspect
Police sketch of suspect
A barmaid recalled that Vaughan had been in the bar the evening before her death with a Caucasian man with a round face who walked with a limp and wore glasses. They had been drinking together. The witness was able to provide enough details for a police artist to make a sketch, which was distributed around town. Yet no one came forward to identify him.

Theresa Sciortino was discovered in her apartment on Arrott St.
Theresa Sciortino was discovered in her apartment on Arrott St.

Then on January 19, 1989, Theresa Sciortino, age 30, was found in her apartment, stabbed twenty-five times. She lived alone in her Arrott Street apartment, three blocks from the fifth victim and a block and a half from Frankford Avenue. Like Durkin, she, too, had been in several psychiatric institutions and was currently an outpatient under treatment. When she was discovered, she wore only a pair of white socks, and she had been left in a pool of blood on her kitchen floor, lying face-up. Again, the attacker had used a sharp knife to slash her twenty-five times in the face, arms, and chest, and had also used a three-foot piece of wood to sexually assault her. He placed the bloodstained weapon leaning against the sink, and according to Newton, left a bloody footprint behind. A neighbor had heard a struggle the evening before, along with a loud thump, as if a large object had been thrown to the floor. Detectives confirmed that the condition of the apartment indicated that an intense struggle had occurred there, moving from one room to another. Blood was spattered everywhere.

Sciortino, like the other victims, had frequented the Frankford Avenue strip and often entertained male companions. One of her neighbors said, "She had a lot of company." Questioning confirmed that she was last seen alive at the Jolly Post Tavern, at Griscom and Arrott Streets (erroneously famous for being one of George Washington's overnight stops). Someone had seen her in the company of a middle-aged white man just after 6:00 in the evening. Not long afterward, her neighbor heard the scuffle in her apartment.

Philadelphia police patch
Philadelphia police patch
Detective Lt. James Henwood told reporters that with this sixth victim in the Frankford area, they had returned to the possibility that a serial killer was operating in the neighborhood, but medical examiner Paul Hoyer had accepted the common but mistaken notion that serial killers kill much more frequently, with only a few weeks between their attacks. Yet the facts were clear: All of the victims had been white women, and while their ages differed dramatically from 28 to 68, they had frequented the same area, had been viciously stabbed, and had been killed in ways that left little evidence and no witnesses. Detectives pointed to boxloads of transcripts from interviews they had done with employees and patrons in the area, which hadn't turned up a single lead. They searched sewers and trash bins in the area of Sciortino's apartment in the hope of finding a murder weapon, but did not comment on the results. (Later, it was revealed that they had found nothing.)

Yet given the possibility of a serial killer, the police had reviewed some older files and had decided that a 1987 murder might well be connected to these six. Catherine M. Jones, 29, had been found on January 29, frozen, covered in snow, and partially clad on a sidewalk in the Northern Liberties section of the city. She worked as a waitress and had been a patron of the Frankford Avenue bars. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire While she had been bludgeoned to death, and there were circumstances in her background that offered leads to indicate that her murder was not related to the others, she could not be ruled out of the series, either. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Her jaw was broken and her skull crushed. (She is often left out of the lineup of victims in later accounts, so it may be that she did not end up in the official final tally for the Frankford Slasher.)

The victims' families felt it was urgent that the killer be caught before he had the chance to kill anyone else. They did not get their wish.

Chinese Ambassador to Germany

237. Japan Safeguards its Codes and Secret Documents.



During the months of May‑July 1941, Japan maintained strict security in regard to its codes. On May 27, 1941 Foreign Minister Matsuoka, warning the Japanese representative at Singapore that a secret abbreviation code was being sent there, asked him to ascertain if there were any possibility of it being inspected by non‑Japanese. [905] The Japanese Foreign Minister also em­phasized that in order to insure the secrecy of their diplomatic telegraphic systems, code mes­sages were to be avoided when the enemy was aware of the contents of the dispatch. [906]

Reports from Manchuria in early June 1941 not only showed that the Japanese were exercising care in the transmission of coded dispatches, [907] but also revealed their concern over the open­ing of their mail. [908]

On July 5, 1941 Japanese representatives in Hongkong revealed that their secret documents and telegraphic material had been placed in care of the Consul at Hankow with instructions to burn them should the necessity arise, [909] and on July 14, 1941 the Imperial portraits from Hong­kong reached the Japanese Consul in Canton. [910] Such action was taken in preparation for an emergency, for with the German‑Soviet war in progress, Japan recognized that it had a rare opportunity to strengthen its position in the south. [911]



238. Japan Negotiates for Critical Products in China.



It was reported from Shanghai on June 5, 1941 that Japanese negotiations with foreign oil firms were to be renewed, probably along the same lines as those begun in November 1940 be­tween the China branch of the Japanese Board of Planning, the field service of the Japanese War Department, and the Standard Oil Company, but never completed because of Tokyo's objections. Under that agreement, 50,000 drums of 86 octane gasoline were to be delivered to Shanghai on the condition that they be moved to the interior. [912]

A report from Tientsin on July 16, 1941 dealt with the difficulty of obtaining powdered milk for babies in North China. Negotiations with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry were to be undertaken for the immediate shipment of this vital commodity. [913] Since Tokyo had also been unable to import opium and certain ingredients for medicines from foreign countries, it requested on July 16, 1941 that Manchukuoan officials turn back to the Japanese govern­ment for home use the opium and narcotics seized in North China. [914]

Because of the lack of gasoline as a result of America's and Britain's freezing order, trans­portation within Tainan became increasingly difficult. Since cotton deliveries were imminent, and the demands of the Shantung automobile association were great, Japanese representatives suggested that gasoline stocks of the local Asia, Standard and Texas companies be used. [915] On August 5, 1941 purchases of gasoline from the stores of the three foreign oil companies was permitted by the Japanese, but only under strict supervision. [916]



[905] II, 895.

[906] II, 896.

[907] II, 897.

[908] II, 898.

[909] II, 899.

[910] II, 900-901.

[911] II, 901.

[912] II, 902.

[913] II, 903.

[914] II, 904.

[915] II, 905.

[916] II, 906.



172



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



239. Japan Curtails Chungking's Supplies.



The drastic methods taken by the Japanese to cut off China's supplies caused both British and French officials to protest, on June 10, 1941, the confiscation of nearly $890,000 in Chinese money found by the Japanese military authorities in the French Concession, Shanghai. [917] During economic negotiations held between the representatives of China, Manchukuo, Japan and Germany, the latter also expressed its disapproval of the Japanese embargo of goods belonging to Chinese and German firms in Hankow which had been slated for shipment to Shanghai. Tokyo replied on June 23, 1941 that since the question of transporting such goods involved consultation with the military authorities, the problem could not be handled through ordinary channels. [918]

According to a Japanese intelligence report, Mr. Mi Chi Fang, a Chungking representative in Shanghai, received a warning on July 6, 1941 that Tokyo was expected to declare war and to confiscate all Chinese assets in Shanghai; therefore, all Chinese firms and merchants in Shanghai were ordered to transfer their commercial interests to foreign names. [919]

Japan realized, according to a report on July 17, 1941, that if Chungking could be completely cut off from its foreign allies, Chiang Kai‑shek's army could hold out no longer than ten months and the China incident would be at an end. [920] Therefore, all aid from America and Britain was watched carefully. On July 28, 1941 an order was issued by the North China army that Japanese forces at other points should place all factories and warehouses belonging to the British and Americans under close observation. In order not to provoke either of these countries, no action that could be construed as coercion was to be taken nor was the supervision to be so close as to arouse suspicion. [921]



240. Chinese Reaction to German‑Russian War.



The Japanese noted that on June 23, 1941 the Chinese Communist Party sent a message to Chungking expressing its friendly attitude toward Soviet Russia. The closing of German and Italian Embassies as well as Consulates, and the expulsion of Axis nationals from China were demanded, and in turn, full cooperation with Chungking for the successful conclusion of the war was promised. On the other hand, the pro‑German faction leader, Mr. Chu Chia Hua, urged the Chinese government to confer with both German and Italian authorities before announcing a definite stand with regard to the Russian question. [922]

Other intelligence reports emanating from China on June 27, 1941 disclosed that Mr. Chiang Po‑Ching, governor of the Chekian province, was endeavoring to maintain effective relations with Germany, and that, following this policy, the showing of Charlie Chaplin's motion picture, "The Dictator", had been prohibited in Chungking. Since Mr. Chiang Po-Ching believed that the German military efforts in Russia had been 70% preparation and 30% propaganda, with the reverse being true of Russia, he predicted that Germany would bring the Russian war to a speedy conclusion.



[917] II, 907.

[918] II, 908.

[919] II, 909.

[920] II, 910.

[921] II, 911.

[922] II, 503. (Japanese‑British Relations)



173



According to Mr. Chiang Po‑Ching, Mr. T. V. Soong and Madame Chiang Kai‑shek had been advocating the necessity of opposing Japan through Anglo‑Russian and United States-Russian collaboration. Though Russia had suspended aid to China, Mr. Chiang Po‑Ching believed that there was some hope of getting supplies from Australia for the next two or three years. He also pointed out that the Chinese Communists, who had always opposed Anglo-American imperialism, were now finding it necessary to reverse their position and to depend on America and Britain. [923]



241. Japanese Report of Divergent Views of Chungking and Chinese Communists.



Because the attitude of the Chungking government toward the Japanese‑Soviet neutrality pact affected Kuomintang‑Communist relations and Generalissimo Chiang Kai‑shek's position in regard to peace with Japan, these reactions were carefully observed by the Japanese in the latter part of June 1941. [924]

Investigating the relations between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party in China, Ambassador Gauss, according to a Japanese report of June 16, 1941 had learned from the Russian Ambassador that since the conclusion of the Japanese‑Soviet agreement and the agreement of the United States to assist in the stabilizing of Chinese currency, intensified suppression of Chinese Communists had been noticed. Russia's decision to cut off war materials to China had caused internal dissension, and the refusal of the Nationalist Party to grant military funds to the 18th Army and the rejection of an allegedly sincere peace offer by the Communist Party widened the breach between the two factions. The Russian Ambassa­dor remarked that although the Chinese Communist Party had long endeavored to avoid civil strife, the imprisonment of its leaders and ruthless suppression by the intransigent Chungking faction would encourage the Chinese Communists to defend the democratic political rights of the people. [925]

According to a report from Hongkong on June 28, 1941, Chungking had found that its efforts to get the Chinese Communists to comply with orders were facilitated not only by the lining up of Britain, the United States, and Soviet Russia behind Chungking, but also by the gradual growth of the opinion that a peace was not yet possible between Britain and Germany. The Chinese Communists were reported, however, as believing that little prospect of improve­ment existed for Russia's relation with the United States and Britain, and that Russia, by taking advantage of the weakening of all belligerent powers, would eventually win the war.

They felt that Chungking was unwise in not defining her attitude toward Germany and Italy since Chungking could not depend on future assistance from the United States, and China's position was growing more precarious with the decrease of aid from Russia, and because of the United States' efforts to appease Japan. Furthermore, friction between Chungking and the Communist Party would not cease owing to the increasing activity of pro‑German and pro-Japanese factions within the country.

Since Japan would devote its entire effort to settling the China incident, the Communists believed that China must realize that Japan would bring stronger military and political pressure to bear. Japan would demand, in accordance with the Tripartite Pact, concessions in the Far East from Soviet Russia, and for this it would also endeavor to secure the consent of the United States and Great Britain. [926]



[923] II, 912.

[924] II, 913.

[925] II, 914.

[926] II, 915.



174



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



242. Japan Decides Not to Occupy Macao.



Possibly because its attention was focused elsewhere, on June 25, 1941 Japan abandoned its plan to occupy Macao, since Tokyo realized that no benefit could be derived from the occupation. [927] Nevertheless, on June 28, 1941 army and naval officials, as well as the local government, were warned to maintain strict surveillance of the smuggling practices being carried on at Macao to aid Generalissimo Chiang Kai‑shek. [928]



243. Japan Suspects an American‑British‑Chinese Military Alliance.



Reports alleging the existence of an American‑British‑Chinese military alliance flowed into Japan on June 24‑27, 1941. They announced that provisions had been received in Hongkong for the use of American aviation volunteers who were to establish air bases in interior China, ostensibly as an aid to Generalissimo Chiang Kai‑shek but in reality in preparation for war with Japan. [929] A general staff composed of British, Chinese, and American officers was being established for the defense of Yunan, Kweichow, Kwangsi, Burma, Malay, and the Thaiese border; the new aviation bases were to be used jointly by the three powers. [930]

Some Chinese elements were following a devious path in foreign policy for on June 16, 1941 it was reported that the American‑British‑Chinese alliance advocated by Mr. Kuo Tai‑Chi, the former Chinese Ambassador to Britain, had been set aside by Chungking in favor of parallel diplomatic policies toward Germany, Soviet Russia, and Great Britain. [931]

At some time between July 15 and July 20, 1941, Boeing B-17's and eighteen heavy bombers supplied by the United States were expected to reach Rangoon, and to leave there about the middle of August for the interior of China. [932] Further information gleaned by the Japanese pointed to the erection of many American air bases in the southwestern provinces of China, and stated that approximately 200 American planes had been furnished for guarding Burma Road traffic and establishing an air service linking Rangoon, Singapore, and the Philippines. In preparation for war on Japan, 120 Chinese pilots had been sent to Chungking to establish air bases in interior China. [933]

Peking, where First Chief Secretary Smythe of the American Embassy had been replaced by Commercial Attaché Butrick on June 23, 1941, was kept under close observation by the Japa­nese. They were interested in learning whether the visit which Ambassador Gauss and Mr. Butrick had recently made to Chungking meant that the American representatives would re­side there permanently. [934]



244. China Joins Anti‑Axis Propaganda Association.



The Japanese had learned on June 4, 1941 that Mr. James Roosevelt had proposed to Gen­eralissimo Chiang Kai‑shek the establishment of an international league for free governments of Europe in order to counteract the effects of Axis propaganda in South America, South and Western Asia and Africa. [935] Japanese agents in China commented on July 24, 1941 that as a



[927] II, 916‑917.

[928] II, 918.

[929] II, 919‑920.

[930] II, 921.

[931] II, 922.

[932] II, 923.

[933] II, 924.

[934] II, 925.

[935] II, 926.



175



result of this plan, Generalissimo Chiang Kai‑shek was sending a number of graduates of for­eign schools to the United States to engage in propaganda and intelligence work. In accordance with the policy formulated by the United States and China, this cooperative propaganda asso­ciation was to work out ways and means of dealing with all phases of the Far Eastern situation and to exchange intelligence between the United States and China. [936]



245. Japanese Espionage in China.



Evidence of the success of the Japanese espionage organization in China was found in a dis­patch of June 2, 1941 which listed the amount of yen assigned for their special agents. Because Shanghai was the chief source of Japanese intelligence in China, this appropriation was particularly high. [937] On the other hand, the capture of Rojibi, a special activities agent in Macao, about June 23, 1941 disclosed to the Chungking government that its messages were being intercepted and turned over to the Japanese. [938]

In order to educate young Chinese men who would cooperate with the Japanese in their South Seas activities, Tokyo was asked on June 16, 1941 to subsidize a Shanghai institution known as the Self‑Strength School. Although apparently devoted solely to business and com­merce, the school actually trained specially‑selected Chinese students to act as Japanese spies in peacetime and as fifth columnists in the event of war. [939]

Further information regarding the selection and training of Japanese special secret agents was revealed on July 16, 1941, [940] for after the unfortunate incident at the French Concession, [941] Japanese diplomats desired to choose students of foreign languages, who were of a diplomatic type, rather than members of the Japanese military. [942]

As a result of confidential contacts with Chinese connected with the Japanese office in Can­ton, by July 21, 1941 eight Chinese had been selected for this work. [943]



246. Japan Learns of a Chungking‑Chinese Communist Agreement.



Tokyo was informed on July 7, 1941 that since both the Chinese Nationalists and Commu­nists agreed that national interests superseded all other considerations and that unity was their only hope, they were apparently ready to reach an agreement. Having received instruc­tions from the Third International on June 19, 1941 and again on July 2, 1941, the Chinese Communists in Enan agreed to cooperate with the Sinkiang province and Outer Mongolia in forming a revolutionary. committee. When the necessity arose, the Central Revolutionary Military Committee of the Chinese Communists was to be dissolved in favor of a joint Nation­alist‑Communist Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
organization, and within a month the Communist army was to be newly equipped. Furthermore, to eliminate the outstanding difficulty in the way of collaboration between the Nationalists and the Communists, a large part of the Communist army in Cen­tral China was to be withdrawn. [944]



[936] II, 927.

[937] II, 928.

[938] II, 920.

[939] II, 930‑933.

[940] II, 934.

[941] See Japanese‑French Relations.

[942] II, 934.

[943] II, 935.

[943] II, 936.



176



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



About July 14, 1941 the Third International began organizing a Far Eastern Council for revolutionary offense to assist the Chungking regime. Absorbing men and women from Mongo­lia, Ningsia, Chinghai, and Tibet, this council was to instruct and organize them into armies. Under the command of Russian army officers, the military section of this group was to be ar­ranged into twelve shock columns, consisting of sixty thousand men, of which one column would be a chemical detachment of 6,000 men. Getting behind the lines of the Japanese forces in four provinces in both northern and northeastern China, these units were to engage in par­tisan warfare, burning materials belonging to the Japanese army. Other troops cooperating with the Outer Mongolian Russian army were to create disturbances in the rear of the enemy forces. Since the Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Pahi Jushukin, had promised Chungking that such troops would not take an active part in the territories under its jurisdiction, the support of Generalissimo Chiang Kai‑shek was obtained. [945]

Detachments of the Chinese Communist army under Liu Po‑Chao were transferred to Suihoku around August 2, 1941 in compliance with an order issued by the Russian army and with Chungking's tacit consent. In the future the Chinese Communist army was apparently to cooperate with the Russian army, and it was expected that arms and munitions would be supplied from Outer Mongolia. By the end of August 1941 approximately 4,500 men would be attending to the transportation of this material. [946]

It was revealed on August 4, 1941 that the Japanese were greatly concerned over the activi­ties of the Chinese Communists among the workers in the Kailan coal mines, for if the oper­ation of these mines were halted for any reason, it would seriously impair Japanese moves. [947]



247. President Roosevelt Appoints a Political Adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai‑shek.



In addition to sending American technical advisers to China to give military assistance, according to a Japanese report of July 8, 1941 President Roosevelt had also appointed Mr. Lati­more to act as adviser to the Chungking government. Though China was gratified that the United States was taking an active interest in its affairs, it was rumored that Chinese author­ities were displeased because Mr. Latimore lacked experience in political matters and had little knowledge and understanding of China's affairs. [948] Immediately after Mr. Latimore's arrival in Hongkong on July 15, 1941 a newspaper article, probably inspired by the Chungking government, had made it clear that Mr. Latimore should not interfere with Chungking's policy regarding the strengthening of the international popular front by dealing with the Commu­nists. [949]

Tokyo learned on August 2, 1941 that upon his arrival at Chungking, and after exchanging opinions with Ambassador Gauss and Mr. Fox, Mr. Latimore had emphasized that for the strengthening of China it would be necessary to reorganize part of the Chinese government. [950]



[945] II, 937.

[946] II, 938.

[947] II, 939.

[948] II, 940.

[949] II, 941.

[950] II, 942.



177



248. Japanese Use of Newspapers in China.



The Japanese employed newspapers as a cover for other activities. With regard to securing visas which were currently pending for Tokyo staff members, Foreign Minister Matsuoka sug­gested that the application for Mr. Harold Fujii be made as a press correspondent since Mr. Iwatete's status as an "extra" secretary in Singapore had already aroused suspicion, and having another official attached to the Domei news service would be less conspicuous. [951]

Anxious to gain the confidence of the newspaper men, Japanese officials occasionally im­parted to them information of confidential nature that was not intended for publication, but which would acquaint them with the general state of affairs throughout the Empire. At times, however, this confidence was abused, and information was sent out without permission, caus­ing Tokyo great concern. [952] Close supervision of the press was constant, for a "disrespectful article" reflecting China's attitude toward Japan and appearing in the China Weekly Review on June 21, 1941 was reported to Tokyo. [953]

Preparations were begun on July 16, 1941 for a newspaper conference to be held in Canton, which representatives of both Japanese and Chinese papers would attend. They had been invited in order to increase cooperation among the Japanese agencies guiding public opinion so that the establishment of a co‑prosperity sphere in East Asia might be facilitated. With the Chief of the Japanese Publicity Department acting as chairman, the meeting was to be addressed by the head of the Nanking government. [954]

To start a Chinese language newspaper in Saigon which would have an editorial policy fav­orable to Japan, Tokyo was attempting to locate, in the early part of August 1941, Chinese who were capable of publishing and manning the staff of the proposed paper. [955]



249. Japan Deals with its Chinese Allies.



From Peking on July 14, 1941 came the disclosure that the Shansi army, supplied with funds, arms, and ammunition by their former enemy, Japan, was to sign a peace treaty in the city of Yangue in the Shansi province after arranging an armistice with Tokyo. Simultaneously, the Shansi army was to announce its separation from Chungking, its opposition to Communism and its cooperation in the establishment of a new order in the Far East. In return, Japan was to arrange credit for the currency published in the Shansi province and to aid in the reestablish­ment of business. Because of the effect it might have on Chungking, Japan decided to report the official results of this conference with the Shansi army as a failure. [956]

To carry out its own national policy and to cope with the world situation, according to a state­ment from Tokyo, the Japanese government underwent a change on July 16, 1941 and estab­lished a new Cabinet. Tokyo insisted, however, that neither its foreign policy nor its attitude toward Nanking, the seat of occupied China, had changed in any way. Increased power and progress was pledged to China by the Japanese Cabinet in return for cooperation in the reali­zation of stability in the Far East. [957]



[951] II, 943.

[952] II, 944.

[953] II, 945.

[954] II, 946‑947.

[955] II, 948.

[956] II, 949‑950.

[957] II, 951.



178



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



250. Generalissimo Chiang Kai‑shek Reorganizes His Armies.



For the purpose of effecting unity under the joint commands of Chen Cheng and Pai Chunghsi, and at the same time to coordinate the activities of miscellaneous forces in preparation for a future attack on Thailand and French Indo-China, Generalissimo Chiang Kai‑shek reorga­nized his armies and appointed some new leaders in July 1941. [958] At some time between July 7 and July 20, 1941 special duty troops and other foot soldiers were to move into Burma under secret orders and to form a second line of defense, and Chungking planned to move an army from southern Konan into that area.

Since Great Britain felt that the Chinese army should be responsible for the defense of certain areas, and since the responsibility involved both military and economic questions, studies were being made with the military attaché from the British Embassy so as to reach an agreement. [959]



251. Effect of the United States' Freezing Order on China.



On July 26, 1941 Japanese officials conferred in Shanghai to discuss the freezing order of the United States. While certain retaliatory measures, such as the confiscation of property, were taken against America, no effective financial counter moves had been adopted by the Japanese in Shanghai beyond the prohibition of exports. [960] However, a plan to strengthen the method of adjusting exports from China to third countries was considered, and in order to gain greater control over the removal of materials, it was agreed that regulations published by Japanese financial officials were to apply to China. Further studies were to be made con­cerning other means for the exploitation of China, and the results were to be submitted to the controlling Japanese authorities. [961]

The order freezing Japanese assets also froze Chinese funds at China's own request. From Shanghai, on July 28, 1941, came the report that the order freezing Chinese credits in the United States made it impossible for American banks in China to guarantee payments in American currency in New York. [962]

Tokyo was not keeping its representatives in China informed of details regarding the freezing of Chinese funds since on August 2, 1941 Peking requested further information. [963] Japanese representatives in Shanghai reported on August 4, 1941 that Mr. Fox, connected with the American Commission for Collections and believed responsible for the original freezing order of the United States, had suggested the revision of the freezing of both Japanese and Chinese assets in order to reconstruct Chungking's financial position. Furthermore, Mr. Henchman, the manager of the Shanghai‑Hongkong Bank was willing to give Mr. Fox every support in this matter. [964] The Japanese knew that Mr. Fox had carried out extensive investigation into Chinese financial affairs, and had been urging Chungking to institute some fundamental economic reforms. [965]



[958] II, 952.

[959] II, 953.

[960] II, 954‑955.

[961] II, 954.

[962] II, 956.

[963] II, 957.

[964] II, 958.

[965] II, 958.



179



After August 5, 1941 American and British business firms in Tsingtao had to secure the approval of an adviser appointed by the Japanese authorities for their operations, and unconditional compliance with various orders was demanded. No transfer of the ownership of factories or materials could be made without official approval. Furthermore, the raising of funds and the distribution of profits were also to be in the hands of the Japanese. [966]



252. Japanese Restrictions on Shipping and Travel.



In July 1941 many changes were made with regard to foreign shipping in Japanese waters. No foreign ships were permitted to drop anchor at any port on the Inland Sea, in northern Kyushu, and along the northern coast of the Yamagachi Prefecture with the exception of Kobe, Osaka, and Hakodate, and all but Japanese vessels were held up at the harbor entrance of these three ports. Extreme care was also observed in allowing foreigners to embark on any ship. [967]

Because of the difficult diplomatic situation during August 1941 owing to the Russo‑German war, the strained relations between Japan and England and the United States, and the change in the Japanese Cabinet, restrictions had been placed upon the travel of foreigners throughout Japan, Manchukuo and China. Visas were granted, particularly to military men, only after a complicated procedure. [968]



253. Japan Makes Plans to Conquer Siberia.



In August 1941 the Japanese army established the administrative policy that was to be applied to the conquered areas of Siberia. Under a group of administrators, executive sections including general affairs, peace preservation, transportation, communications, economics and public affairs were to be provided for, and investigations to protect Japanese interests were to be carried on by several independent bureaus. [969]



PART C‑JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD



(i) Japanese‑Nanking Relations.



254. Germans in Nanking Request An Explanation of Japanese‑American Negotiations.



On May 24, 1941 the German Consul General in Nanking called on a Japanese representative and requested an explanation of the rumors that Japan was seeking the aid of the United States in making peace with Chungking. Mr. Nakamura emphatically denied that Japan had any intention of risking the friendship of the Axis by cooperation with the United States. The German diplomat also pointed out that German merchants were worse off under Japanese jurisdiction than they had been under the authority of Chungking. [970]



[966] II, 959.

[967] II, 960.

[968] II, 961‑962.

[969] II, 963.

[970] II, 964.



180



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



255. Japan Is Disturbed by German‑Russian‑Chungking Communications Agreement.



The establishment of communications between Chungking and Germany through Moscow on June 1, 1941 caused Tokyo great concern. [971] When Ambassador Hiroshi Oshima in Berlin, investigated the situation, he found that a daily plane service had been established and an agreement had been made between the postal authorities of Germany and Soviet Russia regarding the handling and cost of mail between Berlin and Chungking. He reported that no apparent political significance was attached to the matter. [972]



256. Japan Prepares a Reception for Mr. Wang Chin Wei.



During June 1941 Tokyo hastened elaborate preparations for the visit of Mr. Wang Chin Wei, the chief of the Nanking government, and his entourage to Japan. Tokyo ordered that Mr. Wang Chin Wei was to be accorded all the honors of a visiting sovereign at least during his brief reception in the Imperial Court. [973] Special plans regarding his audience with the Emperor and arrangements for the meeting of his representatives with the Japanese ministers were outlined. [974] Japanese and Chinese newspapers were given careful instructions and, on June 9, 1941, Tokyo issued to its representatives in Nanking the official report concerning the visit which was to appear in the evening papers of June 14, 1941. Mr. Wang went from Nanking to Tokyo via Shanghai, [975] and the Shanghai Mainichi, commenting upon his former trip to Tokyo, divulged a fact which had been kept secret heretofore by Tokyo. [976]

Because Mr. Wang was apprehensive for the safety of his life, [977] particularly after a member of the Nanking government, who had formerly been associated with Generalissimo Chiang Kai‑shek, had been captured by Chungking agents, [978] a heavy guard of police officers was detailed to escort the party as far as the suburbs of Shanghai. [979] Special railroad arrangements in Japan were also made for the official party. [980]

As a result of the visit, Japan decided to grant official recognition to the Nanking government on July 1, 1941 and to extend it a loan at the same time. However, since it was felt that the German‑Russian war might delay recognition, the loan was announced on June 28, 1941, [981] about the time the publicity ban concerning Mr. Wang's movements was lifted after his return to China. [982]



257. Germany Recognizes Nanking.



Before Mr. Wang's arrival at the Emperor's court, assurances of Germany's support had been received by Japan. On June 10, 1941, at the request of Mr. Matsuoka, Foreign Minister



[971] II, 965.

[972] II, 966.

[973] II, 967.

[974] II, 968.

[975] II, 969‑971.

[976] II, 972.

[977] II, 973.

[978] II, 974.

[979] II, 975.

[980] II, 976.

[981] II, 977.

[982] II, 978.



181



von Ribbentrop reiterated Berlin's willingness to recognize the Nanking government at any time. [983] Since it was Ambassador Oshima's opinion that this attitude would not change, [984] he suggested that Japan either formally request the recognition of the Wang regime or else convey to the German government the reasons why it was not sought at this time. [985]

On June 27, 1941 Ambassador Oshima revealed that Berlin's recognition of the Nanking government would be in the form of a commercial treaty giving German firms full rights in China. [986] Since Tokyo wished that no news of the German and Italian recognition reach the newspapers before it received official confirmation, it prohibited, on June 28, 1941, any discussion of the question for the time being. [987]

After relations with Chungking had been severed by Germany, its recognition of the Nanking government was made public. Immediately, the Chinese Ambassador to Germany, Mr. Chin Kai, sent a note severely criticizing Berlin for siding with the Japanese, but Germany returned the note as unacceptable. Ambassador Oshima informed Tokyo that by July 10, 1941 the members of the Chinese Embassy and Consulate would leave Germany. [988]

Since there were German citizens residing within the Chungking sphere of influence in China, Germany, expressing its concern, requested the assistance of Japan in safeguarding its nationals in that area. [989] Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire



258. Italy Recognizes the Nanking Government.



Italy was as ready to extend recognition to Nanking as Germany had been. Foreign Minister Ciano informed Ambassador Horikiri, on June 26, 1941, that since the Italian Ambassador to China had lived there three years without presenting his credentials to Chung­king, the formal recognition of the Nanking government presented no difficulties from a political point of view. However, Italy would consult with Germany before making its formal reply. [990]

On June 30, 1941 Italian diplomats in other countries were instructed to recommend that other signatories to the Tripartite Pact recognize the Japanese‑controlled portion of China. At the suggestion of Italy, the Spanish government was expected to adopt a similar attitude regarding Nanking. [991] Croatia announced through the Italian government that it was recognizing the Nanking regime on July 1, 1941, [992] and a few days later arrangements were made to have Croatia recognize another Japanese puppet state in China, Manchukuo. [993]



259. Chungking Severs Relations with Germany and Italy.



After the announcements of the recognition of Nanking by Germany and Italy on July 1, 1941, Chungking, on July 3, 1941, severed diplomatic relations with both Axis powers and evacuated its staff from both countries immediately. [994]



[983] II, 979‑980.

[984] II, 981.

[985] II, 982.

[986] II, 983‑984.

[987] II, 985.

[988] II, 986.

[989] II, Ibid.

[990] II, 987.

[991] II, 988.

[992] II, 989.

[993] II, 990.

[994] II, 991‑992.



182



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



The Italian Ambassador in Shanghai was scheduled to proceed to Nanking on July 1, 1941, [995] and, on July 4, 1941, preparations were underway for the evacuation of Acting Ambassador Adolfo Allesandrini and Italian officials from Chungking. [996] Meanwhile, on July 2, 1941, Wang expressed his appreciation to Japan for the influence it had exerted in behalf of his government. [997]



260. Japan Requests France to Recognize the Nanking Government.



Calling on Admiral Darlan on July 1, 1941, the Japanese Ambassador to Vichy pointed to the growing influence of the Nanking government in China, and in view of the recognition of Nanking by Germany and Italy and the prospective recognition by other European countries, requested that France also recognize it. [998]

Though France was bound by the terms of the German peace treaty, Admiral Darlan explained that France did not necessarily have to act in the same manner as the Axis powers, and until a revised treaty was drawn up giving France an opportunity to cooperate in the new European situation, it was actually in no position to do so. In pointing out the effect of the proposed Japanese aggression against French Indo-China, the Vichy official stated that as long as Generalissimo Chiang Kai‑shek controlled the domain bordering on Indo-China, France's position was precarious. If, however, Russia's aid to Chungking were to vanish, there­by weakening Generalissimo Chiang Kai‑shek's forces, or if German‑French collaboration improved, France could consolidate her policies with those of Germany and Italy. [999]

As a result of his talk with Admiral Darlan, Ambassador Kato informed Tokyo that it would be wise not to press the French too much on the matter of recognition, [1000] but on July 4, 1941 the Foreign Office ordered him to renew his efforts. [1001]

The Japanese Ambassador in Vichy responded promptly in an effort to explain to Foreign Minister Matsuoka his reluctance to exert pressure on France. Pointing out that Japan was seeking bases in French Indo-China on the grounds that the French could not defend it, Ambassador Kato remarked that French recognition of Mr. Wang's government might imply that there was no danger to French Indo-China from other countries. Furthermore, if French‑Japanese negotiations broke down over the question of bases, it would be disadvanta­geous to Japan, if, in reciprocation, the Nanking government had recognized Vichy. [1002]

Ambassador Oshima in Berlin also advised Tokyo not to press for French recognition of Nanking. [1003] Nevertheless, Ambassador Kato again approached Vice‑Premier Darlan on July 14, 1941 in regard to recognition for Nanking, only to receive the vague answer that the problem would be given careful consideration. [1004]

Japan and French Indo-China entered into a joint defense agreement on July 23, 1941 and in view of this move, on July 31, 1941 the Japanese felt that the French would not be making



[995] II, 988.

[996] II, 993

[997] II, 994.

[998] II, 995.

[999] II, Ibid.

[1000] II, Ibid.

[1001] II, 996.

[1002] II, 997.

[1003] II, 998.

[1004] II, 999.



183



too great a concession by going a step further and recognizing the Nanking government. The report that Chungking was sending an influential ambassador, Mr. Wei Tao‑Ming, to France increased Japan's desire to have the French take a pro‑Japanese stand at this time. [1005]



261. Axis‑Dominated Countries Recognize Nanking.



On July 8, 1941 Japan requested Germany's assistance in having both Denmark and Finland recognize Nanking and, at the same time, Manchuria. [1006] On July 12, 1941 Mr. E. Freiherr Weiszaecker, Chief of the Political Section of the German Foreign Office, explained that Herr von Ribbentrop's approval would have to be obtained before any action could be taken, [1007] but a few days later Germany ordered its ministers in Finland and Denmark to submit the request for recognition to those governments. Japan also submitted the request to the ministers of Finland and Denmark, and the Nanking government arranged the details of the recogni­tion. [1008] A short time later, on July 23, 1941, it was reported that Finland had recognized Manchukuo and that recognition of the Nanking government was soon to follow. [1009] Denmark was to recognize Nanking in mid‑August, 1941.

Because of Thailand's neutral position in regard to the war in Europe, Tokyo, on July 4, 1941, expressed doubt that it could force Thaiese recognition of Nanking. However, Prime Minister Pibul was to be asked to consider the matter. [1010] It was announced on July 29, 1941 that Thailand would recognize Manchukuo on August 1, 1941. [1011]



262. Japan Removes Anti‑Axis Chinese Diplomats.



Japan and Germany collaborated in choosing diplomatic representatives who were pro‑Axis in sentiment. On June 28, 1941 Mr. Matsuoka announced that Tokyo would assist Nanking in replacing diplomats from Chungking in the countries that had recognized the Nanking government, with the exception of those persons who could be persuaded to swear allegiance to Nanking and to sever connections with Generalissimo Chiang Kai‑shek. [1012] However, the Japanese were forced to tolerate some of the Chinese diplomats since satisfactory substitutes were difficult to obtain. [1013]

In an attempt to strengthen its position in China, in early July, 1941, Japan requested Germany to eliminate from its consulates, and diplomatic establishments in China, those German officials who were stubbornly anti‑Japanese. [1014]



263. Japan Attempts to Win Over Chinese Diplomats from Chungking.



During June and July, 1941 much attention was paid to winning over Mr. Chin Kai, the Chinese Ambassador to Berlin, to Japanese views through some connections with the Manchu‑



[1005] II, 1000.

[1006] II, 1001.

[1007] II, 1002.

[1008] II, 1003.

[1009] II, 1004‑1006.

[1010] II, 1007.

[1011] II, 1008.

[1012] II, 1009‑1011.

[1013] II, 1012.

[1014] II, 1013.



184



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR





kuoan Minister in Berlin. [1015] Regardless of any declaration of loyalty that Mr. Chin Kai might make to the Nanking regime, however, the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, who was to take over matters connected with the management of the Chinese Embassy in Berlin, requested on June 30, 1941 that the Chinese diplomat not be allowed to serve in Germany. [1016] In view of his past connection with the Chungking government, the Japanese Ambassador in Rome suggested on July 1, 1941, that Mr. Chin Kai be sent to Nanking to show his willingness to serve the "New Order" in East Asia. [1017] However, a few days later, Ambassador Oshima stated that although Mr. Chin Kai was possibly useful, he was not considered a suitable person to represent Mr. Wang's government. [1018]

Furthermore, on July 10, 1941 the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin reported that Mr. Chin Kai and his staff had left for Switzerland to arrange their return to China, and he asked that they be kept under close observation. [1019] To add to Tokyo's difficulties, on July 11, 1941 the Japanese Ambassador in Italy reported that the Chinese Ambassador in Italy was also iden­tified as a strong Chiang admirer and vigorously opposed to Japan. [1020]

Nevertheless, on July 14, 1941 Tokyo was revealed as still attempting to persuade Ambassa­dor Chin Kai to accept the Wang regime. [1021] On July 24, 1941 Mr. Fujii, a telegraphic secretary in Spain, called on Mr. Chin Kai to speak to him in the name of the Japanese Ambassador in Madrid. Because of the strained Japanese‑Chinese relation, the former Chinese Ambassador would not grant an interview, but Tokyo intended to approach him again in Hongkong. [1022]



264. Nanking Requests Return of Ambassador Honda.



To stabilize its position, and to consolidate its gains, the Nanking government in the latter part of July 1941 was exerting every means to induce Ambassador Kumataro Honda to return from Tokyo. Japanese representatives in China suspected that certain officials in Chungking were envious of Mr. Wang's position, and that with the encouragement of Ambassador Honda they could easily be persuaded to align themselves with Nanking. They pointed out, however, that if such an important official as Ambassador Honda stayed away from Nanking, the officials in Chungking would lose interest. [1023]



265. Japan Controls Nanking's Relations with Germany and Italy.



In return for the continued cooperation which Germany had given Japan in obtaining the recognition of Nanking, Berlin, on July 3, 1941, requested assurance, before making a proposal for a German‑Nanking Trade Agreement, that Germans in Nanking would be accorded the same privileges as the Japanese. [1024] However, the Japanese announced that they were to be consulted first, instead of the Nanking government, in all questions concerning foreign inter­ests.



[1015] II, 1009-1011.

[1016] II, 1014.

[1017] II, 1015.

[1018] II, 1016.

[1019] II, 1017.

[1020] II, 1018.

[1021] II, 1019.

[1022] II, 1020.

[1023] II, 1021.

[1024] II, 984.

[1025] II, 1022.



185



Both Germany and Italy were informed that trade negotiations would be handled by the North China Political Council which was controlled by Japanese advisers. [1026] In view of this, while Japanese authorities were completing negotiations with the Nanking government, Mr. Shiniokuro Hidaka, the Japanese Minister to Nanking, advised Mr. Wang to keep in close contact with Japan when discussing matters concerning both Germany and Italy. [1027]



266. Reorganization of the Nanking Government.



At a directors' meeting of the Far Eastern Reconstruction Bureau on July 12, 1941, it was decided that the balance of the customers' revenue in Canton should be transferred to the Nanking government, after deducting the deficit created prior to the establishment of the new regime, and some other expenses. If, however, the revenue allotted to Nanking were so insuffi­cient that deficits would occur in the appropriations necessary for the execution of its anti-Communist policy, then the money accumulated as a share of the Foreign Loan Collateral Fund in Shanghai would also be given to Nanking. [1028]

Commercial Attaché Yoshio Nakamura and Ambassador Honda cooperated in planning for the reorganization of the Nanking government to bring about a closer relationship with Japan. In order to accomplish this matter, however, the full cooperation of the Japanese army, through the So forces, would have to be obtained. Nevertheless, it was felt, on July 23, 1941, that the reorganization of the Nanking government, with the full approval and cooperation of Mr. Wang, would be successfully achieved by August 10, 1941. [1029]



267. Formal Installation of Mr. Wang.



During the last days of July 1941, the formal installation of Mr. Wang, as head of the Nanking government, was scheduled to take place. To emphasize the consolidation of Japanese hold­ings in China, trips to Manchuria and Kwantung during the latter part of July and the first ten days in August, 1941 were planned for Mr. Wang. [1030] On August 2, 1941, Mr. Wang went to Canton, where he was greeted by the military commander and by the highest ranking Japa­nese and Chinese military and governmental officials, as well as the German and Italian Con­suls General. At a session of the Far Eastern Newspaper Conference on August 4, 1941, he was slated to receive congratulatory notes from Prime Minister Konoye and Foreign Minister Matsuoka. [1031]



PART C‑JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD



(j) Japanese‑Netherlands East Indies Relations.



268. Japan Attempts Political and Economic Domination of the Netherlands East Indies.



According to a Japanese resume of Japanese‑Dutch trade negotiations, in November, 1939 Tokyo had proposed the commencing of trade negotiations with the Dutch East Indies, and the



[1026] II, 1023‑1024.

[1027] II, 1025.

[1028] II, 1026‑1027.

[1029] II, 1028‑1029.

[1030] II, 1030‑1032.

[1031] II, 1033‑1034.



186



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



Dutch government had agreed in principle. However, with the spread of the European war to Holland in May 1940, and the resulting mobilization of the economic resources of the East Indies, plans for these conferences were laid aside.

Though Japanese leaders were striving to create a "New Order" in the Far East, Japan had become increasingly dependent upon the natural resources of the Dutch East Indies just when the European war began to absorb them. Japan requested a guarantee from Dutch leaders that certain strategic materials would be made available, and Tokyo declared that the Dutch had promised to continue economic relations with Japan, no matter what happened in Europe, since cooperation with Japan would aid Dutch interests and would provide stability in the Far East. [1032]

The Japanese continued to exert pressure throughout 1940 and 1941, and two missions came from Tokyo, ostensibly for economic discussions, but in reality seeking political domination. However, according to reliable information received on May 21, 1941, the Japanese learned that the Dutch had decided against their trade proposals and would demand the return of the Japanese representatives to their home country. [1033]

On the same day Foreign Minister Matsuoka announced that the Dutch, at the suggestion of the British, were about to impose a general embargo on rubber and tin exports from the East Indies to Japan as British Malaya had already done. Out of deference to the Japanese delegates and trade representatives in Batavia, Mr. Hoogstraten, [1034] was withholding the publication of this embargo procedure until Japanese representatives had time to withdraw from the Nether­lands East Indies. [1035]

In view of these reports, on May 22, 1941 the Japanese Vice Minister questioned Mr. Pabst, the Netherlands Minister to Tokyo, concerning the influence of the United States and Great Britain in restricting Dutch exports to Japan. He also made it clear that under existing cir­cumstances Japan felt it wise to recall its representative, Mr. Yoshizawa, and possibly plan further retaliatory measures. Realizing that the Dutch attitude was based on the assumption that these vital materials were being reshipped to Germany, the Japanese Vice Minister attempted to avoid discussing this problem by stating that rubber and tin imported from the Netherlands East Indies were to be used in the rapidly expanding Japanese arms production. Anxious to keep Japanese‑Dutch relations on a friendly basis in spite of the disagreement in policy, Mr. Pabst stated that some understanding would be reached if Japan would reveal the figures concerning the actual demand for the supply of these raw materials. [1036]



269. Dutch Opposition to a Japanese Order.



An obstacle to Japanese‑Dutch economic cooperation had already arisen in the early part of May 1941 when an order from Foreign Minister Matsuoka directed all foreign firms in Japan to make entries in their accounts in the Japanese language. This would facilitate checking by Tokyo in the event that Japan's credits abroad were frozen. [1037] Since Japanese organizations, as well as other foreign firms in the East Indies, were permitted to keep their books in either the English or Malayan language, Dutch officials pointed out that if, in retaliation, the Dutch



[1032] II, 1035.

[1033] II, 1036

[1034] Spelled Hofstraaten in nearly all translated dispatches in the files of U.S. Communication Intelligence.

[1035] II, 1037, 1038.

[1036] II, 1039.

[1037] II, 1040.



187



government required Japanese commercial and industrial enterprises to make their entries in Dutch, the inconvenience would be tremendous and great losses would undoubtedly be in­curred. In order to work out some agreement, therefore, a conference was called by commercial representatives of the two countries. Japanese officials in Batavia urged Mr. Matsuoka to do nothing which would force Dutch officials to retaliate by demanding that all Japanese firms in the East Indies make entries in the Dutch language. [1038]



270. Japan Makes New Proposals to the Dutch.



Learning in the latter part of May 1941 that British and Dutch commercial attaches in Tokyo were making surveys of Japanese rubber needs, the Chief of the Japanese Trade Bureau called the Netherlands delegate to his office on May 30, 1941 and showed him statistics which had been prepared concerning Japanese consumption of raw rubber, shipments to Manchukuo and China, and the probable amount of imports. Explaining to the Dutch official that even by economizing on its needs Japan would experience a rubber shortage, since it needed 30,000 tons, the Tokyo representative asked that Mr. Yoshizawa's request for 20,000 tons of rubber be hon­ored by the Netherlands. The Netherlands' commercial attaché assured the Japanese govern­ment that the matter would be taken up with his minister in Batavia. [1039]

Foreign Minister Matsuoka was certain on May 28, 1941, despite secret reports to the con­trary, [1040] that the government of the Netherlands East Indies was not considering breaking off negotiations entirely, for the Dutch officials had promised to give careful consideration to some revised Japanese proposals presented on May 14, 1941. [1041] Details of the Japanese pro­posals were uncovered by American cryptanalysts on June 12, 1941. [1042] As many permits for entry into the East Indies as could possibly be granted, at least 1,600 a year, were desired for Japanese employees. Furthermore, in order to permit Japanese penetration into obscure and inconvenient places, a fixed number of Japanese doctors were to be allowed to practice through­out this area.

While assuring the government at Batavia that it had no desire to impair Dutch national defense or the economic stability of local inhabitants, Japan demanded permission to estab­lish and expand independent as well as joint enterprises throughout the East Indies. Further­more, Japan asked that it be granted petroleum rights in certain areas. To ensure the estab­lishment of adequate communications between the two countries, a direct airline was to be set up at the first opportunity. A modern cable line between Japan and the East Indies was to be constructed under Japanese supervision, and existing wireless communications were to be improved.

In the event that world circumstances made it imperative that Japan increase its shipping tonnage, certain coastal ports were to be opened immediately in order to facilitate the unload­ing of special goods. Referring to the quota set on East Indies' exports, Japan emphasized its need for rubber, tin, bauxite, copra and palm oil. In regards to Dutch acceptance of Japanese imports, a minimum of approximately 80% of the Netherlands East Indies products exported to Japan was to be established. [1043]



[1038] II, 1041.

[1039] II, 1042.

[1040] II, 1043.

[1041] II, 1044.

[1042] Hubertus J. van Mook‑The Netherlands Indies and Japan, W. W. Norton and Co., N.Y., 1944, pp. 99‑106 for complete English text.

[1043] II, 1045.



188



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



271. Dutch Indignation at Japanese Newspaper Attacks.



On June 1, 1941 at a critical moment in the current negotiations, Japanese representatives in Batavia requested Tokyo to restrain the Japanese press from attacking the government and people of the Dutch East Indies, since Mr. Hoogstraten, chief of the commercial section of the Netherlands Indies government, had already officially denounced recent stories appearing in Japanese newspapers. Unless the newspaper attacks were retracted, the Japanese Minister in Batavia believed that Japan would be unable to obtain the concessions it desired from the Dutch. [1044]



272. Japanese Propaganda in the Netherlands Indies.



In an attempt to influence public opinion in the Netherlands Indies, Tokyo had allotted large sums of money for propaganda. Though there was some doubt as to the wisdom of its subsidizing a Japanese language newspaper in the East Indies, on June 2, 1941, Tokyo was con­sidering the project, for it had already established many official and semi‑official organizations in Taiwan to aid Japan's advance in the South Seas, and these were apparently quite success­ful. [1045]

The Japanese Minister in Batavia reported on June 22, 1941 that the regular European language periodicals which Tokyo sent on for distribution in the East Indies were widely read, if of cultural value, but that anything smacking of Axis propaganda was immediately rejected by the Dutch. With regard to the future distribution of propaganda material, Mr. Ishizawa reported that his agency intended in the future to concentrate its activities in a given local area. [1046]

Negotiations were under way by July 17, 1941 to have Japan subsidize the East India Daily and the Chinese Suratan. [1047]



273. The Netherlands Reject the Japanese Proposals (June 6, 1941).



On June 6, 1941 the Netherlands government delivered its reply to the Japanese proposals of May 14, 1941. Though noting with satisfaction the modifications which Japan's representa­tives had made as a result of discussions on various points at issue, and expressing its appreciation for the endeavors of the Tokyo delegation to adapt its propositions to the emergencies of the world situation, and at the same time to make them compatible with Netherlands East Indies' policies, the Dutch pointed out that the views of the Japanese government were still basically and radically at variance with their principles. [1048]



(a) No Special Privileges for Japanese.



In emphasizing the supposed inadequate development of natural resources in the Nether­lands Indies, the Dutch declared that the Japanese had mistakenly assumed that interdepend­ence existed between the two countries. Special privileges for Japanese interests in the Netherlands would militate against the fundamental economic policy of the Netherlands gov‑



[1044] II, 1046,

[1045] II, 1047.

[1046] II, 1048.

[1047] II, 1049.

[1048] II, 1050.



189



ernment which stressed nondiscrimination against friendly foreign powers. Since they were capable of developing their own economic life and resources, the peoples of the Netherlands archipelago had little desire to weaken their own economy by the too liberal admittance of foreign interests. In view of certain conditions it was absolutely necessary to open up the resources and the reserve labor market of this area to the subjects of the Dutch kingdom. There­fore, the relations between the Netherlands and foreign countries for the duration of the war must necessarily be affected by subjection of trade to certain unavoidable restrictions in order to promote the war effort, not only of the Netherlands East Indies, but also of the Dutch king­dom and its allies. Consequently, the Japanese government should understand that labor permits could be granted to foreigners only if the vacancies could not be filled by Netherlands' subjects.

While an expeditious handling of such applications for labor permits was assured, the ad­mission of Japanese nationals could not be guaranteed according to the quota asked in the Japanese memorandum. According to the Dutch, not only would this constitute an inadmissible discrimination against other foreign countries, but it would also impair the interests of their own workers. Favorable consideration was promised for Japan's request that Japanese doctors be permitted to care for Japanese residents, but their medical practice could not be extended to others than Japanese living in the East Indies. [1049]



(b) Restriction of Certain Enterprises to Dutch.



If the establishment of any enterprises by foreigners constituted a fitting contribution to the economic development of the country, no objection would be made by the Netherlands' govern­ment. However, it was necessary to reserve the more important branches of industry, including the exploration and exploitation of mineral oil products, fisheries, mining, and other commer­cial businesses, for Dutch subjects. Industrial education of the rural masses was already one of the main problems of the Netherlands' government without further complications arising from the competition of powerful foreign firms. [1050]



(c) No Need for Cables.



Referring to the Japanese proposals for the improvement of traffic connections between the Netherlands East Indies and Japan by air lines to Bangkok, Saigon, and other places, the Netherlands' government expressed a willingness to cooperate, though pointing out that future development of air transportation was uncertain. As to improvement of radio commu­nications, the Netherlands could see no reason for the duplication of their already established telegraphic system by expensive submarine cables. [1051]



(d) No Expansion of Coastal Navigation.



In regard to coastal navigation around the Netherlands East Indies, the Dutch made it clear that although special privileges had already been granted to certain vessels, including Japanese ships, it was the general policy to prevent any foreign ships from carrying on such activity. However, for the maintenance of Dutch enterprises, coastal shipping privileges would be granted within certain limitations. [1052]



[1049] II, Ibid.

[1050] II, Ibid.

[1051] II, Ibid.

[1052] II, Ibid.



190



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



(e) Dutch Restrictions on Imports Into the Indies and Exports to Japan.



Since the great market of the Netherlands East Indies was dependent upon trade with many countries, it was necessary that the Dutch themselves made adjustments with regard to the import and export situation. Furthermore, in order to prevent their exports from providing the enemy with materials of strategic value, the Netherlands must impose certain restrictions. Consequently, no definite quota for any of their commodities for an extended period of time could be guaranteed to a foreign country. Nevertheless, the Japanese government was assured that abrupt changes in the Netherlands Indies commercial policy would be avoided.

Though unsettled circumstances made it almost impossible to establish any trade commitments during the next twelve months, the Netherlands' government was prepared to issue permits for the exportation of goods during the next six months. As long as the prices and terms of delivery could meet competition from other countries, Japan would be allowed to send imports to the East Indies.

On the basis of the so‑called Hoogstraten‑Ishizawa and the van Mook‑Kotani agreements, Netherlands officials believed that the position of the Japanese importers had been satisfac­torily settled. Appreciating the difficulty of the Japanese government in adjusting its internal economic policy on the basis of uncertain trade importations, the Netherlands' government expressly stated its export regulations for the year 1941. [1054]



(f) Netherlands Proposals.



The Netherlands made several proposals to the Japanese. Because a shortage of sugar was known to exist not only in the Japanese Empire but also in adjacent regions, Tokyo was to import Javanese sugar at the rate of 150,000 tons a year for the remaining months of 1941. The amount of ebony imported into Japan from the Netherlands East Indies, as well as the shipment of coffee, was to be established at a definite rate for the same period of time. Various schedules were established for the exportation of other essential raw materials. [1055]

inattention problems 2.ina.100203 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Evidence for same-sex education’s benefits has been mixed for grade school students and stronger for high school students, especially for girls. But any advantages of same-sex classes at later ages may not apply to preschoolers, in Moller’s view. The new study primarily examines variations in classroom sex composition rather than all-boy and all-girl classes. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire The proportion of boys in each class ranged from 25 percent to 100 percent.

Further research needs to examine whether behavior and inattention problems, including attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, get magnified in majority-boy preschool classrooms, causing teachers to spend relatively little time on learning activities, adds psychologist Jeanne Brooks-Gunn of Columbia University.

chemokine 4.che.0001 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Battling malaria for millennia helped Africans build barriers against the parasite that causes it, but that defense has proven to be a double-edged sword for HIV infection.

A genetic variation that prevents a protein called the Duffy antigen from being made in red blood cells defends against malaria. But that defense mechanism increases an individual’s chance of contracting HIV by about 40 percent, an international group of researchers reports in the July 17 Cell Host & Microbe. The genetic variant could account for 2 million to 3 million cases of HIV in Africa, where about 95 percent of the population carries the variant. Once infected, though, people who carry the genetic variant are able to survive longer with the disease.

Compared with people of European heritage, people of African descent tend to do slightly better when infected with HIV, says Vicente Planelles, a molecular virologist at the University of Utah School of Medicine in Salt Lake City. When infected with HIV, people of African heritage don’t progress as quickly to AIDS and tend to live slightly longer.

“The slight advantage of Africans can be explained, at least in part, by this variant of the Duffy antigen,” says Planelles, who was not involved in the new study.

The Duffy antigen receptor for chemokines, or DARC, as the protein is formally known, serves as a target on red blood cells for one type of malaria parasite, called Plasmodium vivax. Over many millions of years of living with malaria, people in Africa developed a genetic variation that prevents red blood cells from making the protein, effectively boarding up the door that the parasite uses to enter the cells.

Previously, scientists had hints that DARC could also be involved in HIV infection. The protein’s normal role is to help maintain levels of chemicals called chemokines in the blood. The chemicals prompt white blood cells to move to the site of an infection and trigger inflammation. Chemokines can also inhibit replication of HIV and other viruses.

Other researchers have shown that HIV can latch onto DARC and use the red blood cell as a hiding place until the virus can transfer to a white blood cell.

Matthew Dolan, an infectious disease expert at the Uniformed Services University in Bethesda, Md., studied more than 3,000 members of the Air Force, including 1,200 who are infected with HIV, to find out which genetic factors might play a role in HIV infection and survival. Dolan found that African-Americans who have HIV are far more likely to carry the variant than African-Americans who are not infected. The variant is virtually absent in European-Americans.

Extrapolated to the African population, the variant could be responsible for about 11 percent, “a sizable minority of cases,” Dolan says.

But the researchers also found that the Duffy antigen gene variant lengthened the amount of time it took for AIDS to develop in people who have extra copies of a chemokine gene. The variant also prolonged life, Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire conferring “well over five to six years of protection,” says Sunil Ahuja of the University of Texas Health Science Center in San Antonio and director of the Veterans Administration Research Center for AIDS and HIV-1 Infection.

The researchers think that people who lack the Duffy antigen on their red blood cells have low levels of HIV-fighting chemokines, causing them to be infected more easily. Once the people are infected, though, the low chemokine levels are helpful because the people don’t have strong inflammation that could make the disease worse.

But interactions of several genes with environmental and social factors will determine who gets infected and how sick they get, the researchers say.

“If you look at the spread of HIV, a lot of factors go into the bottom line,” Dolan says. “You can’t just pin the tag on one and say it is responsible.”

Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire cars.9.3

Plunging auto sales are making this one of the worst times ever to sell cars. But if you're one of the relatively rare consumers shopping for a new vehicle, you're already in the driver's seat.

Many dealers have unusually high inventories they want to sell in a hurry, so buyers willing to research price trends, visit numerous dealers and negotiate assertively can pick up a set of wheels at discounts unheard of just a few months ago.
Auto Pilots



Overall, the average transaction price for passenger vehicles has fallen 2.9% in the past six months, to $27,941, while the average cash-back incentive rose 2.3% in April from a year earlier, to $2,628, according to market research firm J.D. Power & Associates.

But for shoppers, the potential savings are substantially greater. Auto makers are offering generous deals, including cash-back offers and low financing rates, across a wide range of vehicles. Many that once sold at a markup are suddenly available for well below the sticker price -- and often less than dealer cost. Flashy new cars, even some 2010 models, already Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire come with low lease rates and hundreds or thousands of dollars in rebates.

"There's no question that you should get a screaming deal," says Scott Painter, chief executive of TrueCar, an online service that tracks new-car purchases. He says the slump in sales has resulted in discounts so steep that new cars can sometimes be less expensive than comparable used ones.

According to data from TrueCar, in July 2008 dealers sold about 21% of 2009 model year vehicles for less than what they paid for them. By March this year, they were selling 25% of 2009 vehicles below cost.

Dealerships, meanwhile, have been closing at an alarming rate -- 960 in 2008 and an estimated 1,200 by the end of this year, according the National Automobile Dealers Association -- driven mainly by slack demand and tight credit. Now car makers General Motors Corp. and Chrysler LLC are planning to close thousands more, opening the door for even better deals.

"With excess supply, it's going to get very aggressive out there," says Gary Dilts, a senior vice president at J.D. Power. "Dealers have to get rid of a lot of 2009 vehicles, so we think it's going to continue to be a consumer's market for the next three months."
Read More

* Chrysler's Nagging Quality Issues

Some of the best deals are available on once-hot models. Until recently, you could get $12,000 cash back on the purchase of a leftover 2008 Range Rover, for example. Just two years ago, this handsome luxury sport-utility vehicle was a popular rolling fashion statement.

It isn't just last year's models that are available at a discount. Cadillac's slick, sporty and reasonably practical new CTS sedan comes with $7,000 in incentives. Ford Motor Co. has barely begun selling its 2010 Transit Connect van, and is already offering $300 cash back.
Dealer Discounts

Eric Sample, a 42-year-old election official in Portland, Ore., says he bought a 2008 Mazda Miata roadster with a sticker price of $27,235 for about $18,000 three weeks ago. A combination of a $5,000 rebate from the manufacturer and more than $4,000 in dealer discounts was more than he could resist. "I didn't think it would get much better," says Mr. Sample, adding that he hadn't bought a new car since 1999.

Chevrolet's 2009 Tahoe hybrid, a large SUV that promises the fuel economy of a smaller vehicle, is in some cases selling for nearly $6,700 off its $51,405 sticker price. Hyundai's new 2009 Genesis luxury sedan can be had for $2,500 below sticker price, and even the long-awaited 2010 Honda Insight hybrid on average is selling at more than $500 below sticker price, according to TrueCar data.

Falling prices and rising rebates reflect the economic uncertainty that has kept many people away from auto showrooms since late last year. This forced car makers to cut production in an effort to keep inventories from growing too quickly. But in many cases demand has retreated even faster than supply, leaving dealers with a glut of unsold cars they are desperate to sell.
[Cardeals] Mazda; Wieck (Cadillac, Range Rover)

From top: 2008 Range Rover Sport, List price: $58,500, Best deal: $52,000; 2009 Cadillac CTS, List price: $40,760, Incentives: $7,000; 2008 Mazda Miata, List price: $27,235, Total discounts: More than $9,000.
Selling at a Loss

Paul Taylor, chief economist at the National Automobile Dealers Association, says GM has 111 days' worth of inventory, Chrysler has 114 and Volkswagen AG has 115. With inventories so high, car makers are offering bigger incentives than usual, and dealers are sometimes willing to let cars go even at a loss.

Among the biggest price swings are those in categories that were popular last year even as the overall auto market sagged, driven by rising fuel prices and a general glut of new cars. Some models that were new at the time attracted buyers seeking the latest design, but mostly it was small cars and gasoline-electric hybrids that dealers couldn't keep on their lots.

Many people recall how hot the Toyota Prius hybrid was last summer when gasoline rose beyond $4 a gallon. People lined up for a chance to buy the fuel-frugal sedan, and many paid above sticker price. Dealerships nearly never had any on the lot because most were spoken for and snapped up as soon as they arrived. Trying to keep pace with rising demand, Toyota Motor Corp. increased production.

Today there are Priuses gathering dust in showrooms and dealer lots, largely because falling gas prices have made them less desirable. According to data from TrueCar, buyers have recently paid an average of $23,324 for the Prius Touring, the top-of-the-line model. It seems like a good deal because it is well below the $25,020 sticker price but less than $100 above the invoice price of $23,269. Yet several buyers have paid below the dealer cost of $22,784.

As Toyota launches a new Prius for 2010, today's price for 2009 models could be $8,000 lower than six or eight months ago, according to Jesse Toprak, an analyst with Edmunds.com, the car-shopping Web site. He says some people paid $3,000 or $4,000 above sticker price for the Prius when fuel prices were near their recent peak. Now prices have swung to the opposite extreme -- $3,000 to $4,000 below dealer cost -- in some cases.
Sites for Car Shoppers

The Internet continues to grow as an aid to shoppers looking for the best deals. TrueCar, which launched last month, uses dealer sales data to show how much people are actually paying for vehicles. The goal, the company says, is to give shoppers the most realistic starting point for negotiation. Eventually, says Mr. Painter, TrueCar hopes send car salesmen "the way of the travel agent."

Rival online service Edmunds.com is testing a formula that calculates what would-be buyers should offer a salesman to get the negotiation started. Several sites, including cars.com, MSN Autos and Edmunds, also list incentives like cash-back and discounts that dealers don't necessarily share with customers.

Jeremy Anwyl, president of Edmunds, says the company considered providing data on individual transactions years ago, but found when it tested the concept that the additional information overwhelmed customers. Its latest service it is testing in a few markets uses similar data to establish an initial offer price that consumers can use when they are ready to buy.